The Kargil War was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir along the Line of Control (LOC). In India, the conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay, the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector of the Pakistani infiltrators.
The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC. The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 miles) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F). An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration.
During the winter of 1998-99, some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly sent Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was code named "Operation Badr" its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries.
Brig. Singh moved court to seek redress. The crux of his defence is that he has been a victim of deliberate discrimination. Though he has blamed the former Chief of the Army Staff, General V. P. Malik, for the treatment meted out to him, the main target of his counterattack is Major General V. S. Budhwar, commander of 3 Division during the Kargil war.
Countering the charge that he vacated Bajrang Post, Brig. Singh put the blame squarely on Maj. Gen. Budhwar. According to the Brigadier, it was the Major General who ordered the vacation of Bajrang Post. Brigadier Singh claimed before the Punjab and Haryana high court that the threat perception conveyed by him to his immediate seniors before the war was ignored and the senior commanders were giving more importance to activities not connected to the defensive role of the army.
"Fighting troops were deployed for catching wild animals and birds and the defense resources were being used for making cages for animals and birds, their transportation, feeding and maintenance," claimed the former commander.
What we do know is that for most of early May Malik did not believe that the situation in Kargil was "very serious". The first intrusions into the Garkhun area had been detected on May 3, and confirmed by patrols of the 3 Punjab Regiment on May 7. A day earlier, troops of the 12 Jat Regiment were ambushed in the Turtok region, where Pakistani helicopters with under-slung loads had been seen in April. On May 9, 1999, he left on an official goodwill visit to Poland. By then it was clear that something was up along the Line of Control (LoC). Two sets of intrusions were detected on May 12 in Dras by a patrol of the Ladakh scouts and Army Aviation helicopters. Troops in Kaksar discovered an intrusion on May 14. And so it went on.
Commanding la dolce vita Ladakh-style was Major-General Budhwar. His focus was obsessive, but none of it was on matters military. On May 16, 1998, 3 Division sent out instructions to its field units informing them of their commanding officer, Major-General V.S. Budhwar's new pet project: building a zoo for Leh, a town with a few thousand residents. Lieutenant-Colonel U.K. Singh sent out a second missive, marked 6361/9/ZOO/Q1, on June 8, 1998."Please ensure," the letter read, "that various types of wild animals/birds are procured and despatched to zoo at Leh at your earliest." "Cages required for transportation of animals/birds," it continued, "will be made under arrangements of respective b(riga)de(s)." "No representation," it concluded, "will be entertained."
He also found time to host top Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh cadre during the 1998 Sindhu Darshan Festival, which was run and managed at Army expense.
IN his own judgment, General Pal was the hero of the Kargil war. He described the campaign he ran as "an example of General-ship unparalleled in the history of warfare". Was it so? On May 19, in the face of what intelligence experts and his own troops were telling him, Pal told the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar that the Kargil "situation was local and would be defeated locally". He insisted that there were "no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes".
Frontline obtained critical intelligence documents and internal military communications which vindicate Surinder Singh's claims. The documents establish that the Brigadier did indeed warn of the possibility of escalated violence in Kargil and a push across the Line of Control (LoC). The documents also show that his superiors, including former Chief of the Army Staff V.P. Malik, refused to act on these warnings, and even blocked 121 Brigade initiatives to defend Kargil more intensively.
On August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter marked 124/GSD/Vis. To this letter were attached the contents of Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of Malik on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides.
In terse military shorthand, the briefing paper warned of a “push [by] militants across the L[ine] (of) C[ontrol]. Pakistan, it said, could “engage NH [National Highway] IA with AD [Air Defence] w[ea]p[o]ns”, “t[ar]g[e]t selected f[or]w[ar]d posts,” and “hit Kargil and outlying vill[age]s”.
Right at the outset, the 121 Brigade briefing paper analysed, in terse military shorthand, the possible "En(emy) Pattern" for the coming months. Pakistan, paragraph 5(a) noted, would seek to keep conflict "alive after (the Pokhran-II) nuc(lear) blasts an d in view (of the) SAARC m(ee)t(in)g of 29 Jul(y) 98 and now for (the) NAM m(ee)t(in)g." This could come, paragraph 5(b) suggested, in the form of a "push (by) militants across the L(ine) (of) C(ontrol). Paragraph 6 noted that Pakistan troops would, amon g other thing, engage NH (National Highway) IA with AD (Air Defence) w(ea)p(o)ns", "t(ar)g(e)t selected f(or)w(ar)d posts", and "hit Kargil and out lying vill(age)s, if escalation takes place".
Paragraph 8, explicitly marked "Enhanced Threat Perception", laid out the reasons for the 121 Brigade's apprehensions. Sections (a) (i) to (iii) of this paragraph recorded fresh Pakistan troop movements, including the deployment of the 24 Sind Regiment, a reserve division from Gilgit, to forward positions at Olthingthang. Another battalion, the paragraph records, had moved "on priority" from Sialkot to Skardu. Heavy and medium guns had been inducted into the sector, paragraph 6 (b) noted, along with M-1 98 155 millimetre mortar, and light flashes, possibly laser designators for smart weapons or missiles, had been seen over Drass and Kargil."
From paragraph 13 onwards, the briefing notes detailed "Vulnerabilities (of the) 121 (I) Inf(antry) B(riga)de". This paragraph itself noted that National Highway 1A was vulnerable to fire from Pakistan positions on Twin Bumps, Bunker Ridge and Point 3249 , while the next paragraph pointed out that Kargil and its rear areas were open to shelling. Paragraph 15 laid out a whole new order of vulnerability. It pointed out that "infilt(ration) routes (were) available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to P anikhar, Yaldor and through nalas (streams)". Small detachments could be targeted, paragraph 15(b) noted, while paragraph 17 noted the existence of posts vulnerable to "rogue action".
On August 30, 1998, Major KBS Khurana of the 1/S23 Intelligence and Field Security Unit at Kargil sent out a hand-written note, marked 1/10/6, referring to disturbing information provided by a source code-named 3820SC. “It has been revealed,” Major Khurana wrote, “that 500 Afghan militants have been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into India in the near future”.
Early in January 1999, Colonel Oberoi called the attention of 3 Infantry Division Commander Major-General VS Budhwar to significant weaknesses in India’s forward defenses, on the basis of an exercise code-named “Jaanch.” In his January 30, 1999 letter, Colonel Oberoi stated enemy action could render “some posts untenable.” It proceeded to call for forces being permanently stationed on Point 5165-metres, Pariyon ka Talab and Point 4660-metres — now famous as Tiger Hill.
Brigadier Surinder Singh protested. In an August 12, 1998 letter, marked 101/GS (Ops)/ANE/R, he warned of the paucity of troops. “While the combating of an insurgency is an important role for the B[riga]de,” Brigadier Singh noted, “we must not loose sight of our primary role, that of ensuring the sanctity of the LoC and integrity of own territory. All the forces which can be spared for the anti-infilt[ration] role from integral t[roo]ps are already deployed.”
Like Lieutenant-General Pal, Major-General Budhwar was dismissive of his subordinates’ concerns. Early in 1999, the 9 Mahar Regiment was moved from its counter-infiltration positions along the Yaldor Langpa, and stationed near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, charged with protecting the Mashkoh-Dras stretch, was also pulled back.
Brig. Surinder Singh's warnings centered on infiltration, and not on conventional engagement. But those warnings, had they been acted on, could have led to early detection of Pakistan's intrusion. No politician, n o bureaucrat, no other military official has been punished for the strategic and tactical failures that led to the loss of over 500 Indian soldiers' lives on the Kargil heights in the summer of 1999. Instead, the one officer who tried to secure measures that could have saved at least some of those lives is paying the price for his superior officers' errors.
Major General Mohinder Puri, commander of the 8 Division which would soon lead the battle in Dras, played the role Pakistan’s Army chief, while 70 Brigade’s Davinder Singh acted as the General-Officer Commanding of Pakistan’s 10 Corps area. Towards the fag end of the exercise, the group gamed a brigade-strength assault on the stretch between Zoji La and Kargil. Pakistan could, the exercise demonstrated, occupy large stretches. Lieutenant-General Pal and Northern Army Commander Hari Mohan Khanna dismissed the idea.
Despite losing approximately a quarter of its troops, to commitments elsewhere, the 121 Brigade did what it could — a fact subsequently suppressed by the official Kargil Review Committee.
From Budhwar and 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal upwards, the Army top brass reacted with panic. Their tactic was to discredit Surinder Singh personally. If Budhwar had nothing but praise for him on July 8, 1999, Kishan Pal wrote a venomous assessment 20 days later. The Ministry of Defence public relations machine went into overdrive, using pliant journalists to suggest Surinder Singh was hysterical and unprofessional.Worst of all, Surinder Singh did indeed furnish evidence to show that he had reason to worry about the forward movement of Pakistan troops. In his second interaction with the committee in December 1999, the Brigadier pointed to a series of intelligence warnings that underpinned his concerns. Letter number 1793/Int dated July 21, 1998, issued by 3 Infantry Division to the 102 and 121 Brigades, mentioned that the 24 Sind regiment had moved to the Kargil sector. Another letter, 1793/Inf (II), sent the same day, quoted an extract from a 15 Corps Headquarters letter, number 1403/3/GS(A) dated July 11, 1998, noting that the 21 Azad Kashmir Battalion had moved to Skardu. A final letter, again numbered 1793/Inf but dated July 23, 1998, noted that a battalion had moved from Sialkot to the area across the LoC from Kargil. The KRC simply blacked out this material and made a false allegation against Surinder Singh.
Brig. Singh added that Maj. Gen. Budhwar overruled the request by him and the commanding officer of 4 Jat subsequently to reoccupy the Post at the earliest.
Brigadier Davinder Singh, an artillery officer who carried out his duties despite being injured in battle, filed a complaint in court that his battle record and performance in Kargil war was fudged. He blamed Lt. Gen. Kishanpal of Srinagar based 15th Corps of downplaying his role in battle and falsifying his records.
The armed Forces Tribunal indicted General Kishan Pal of bias against Brig. Singh under whose command some major victories of Kargil battle were won. Instead of war-time gallantry award, Brig, Singh received a peace-time award. Retired Brigadier Devinder Singh is a relieved man. The Kargil war veteran has won a 10-year old battle that has restored his military reputation and individual honour. In a landmark judgment, the Armed Forces Tribunal has ordered the Army to delete a distorted report on his performance report during the 1999 Kargil war, correcting a decade-old injustice against a professional soldier. The performance report of Lieutenant General Kishan Pal, then General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps, who oversaw operations in that sector not only cost him a war medal but also deprived the Brigadier of promotion as Major-General. Due to the 'fudged' battle accounts, Brig Singh was awarded only a Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) and not a Mahavir Chakra, which he was cited for.
According to Devinder Singh, General Pal's bias stemmed from the following reasons:
Colonel Oberoi was cashiered for his failure to defend against the intrusions — intrusions he had warned of, but was not given resources to act against. Brigadier Surinder Singh, too, was sacked. Brigadier Devinder Singh, lauded in India’s official history of the Kargil war — he “himself operated ahead to keep abreast of the developments during each battle and to inspire his battalions to give of their best” — was passed over for promotion. Many of the officers have moved the courts for justice, but given the slow pace of the Indian judicial system, it will likely be years before their pleas are ruled on.
Budhwar, sources told Frontline, has received only an administrative censure, which will not hamper his long-term career prospects. Kishan Pal, who gamed at the outset for a low-level engagement that his troops would complete in days, was made Quarter Master General. More career advance has been blocked not by his strategic mistakes, but by ill-health. Northern Army Commander H.M. Khanna and former Army chief Malik have had to face no official questioning at all of their conduct.
Ministry of Defence (MoD) now stares at the prospect of an over Rs 1,000-crore fraud in its retired personnel welfare organisation, where senior Major Generals have over the past eight years overseen the swindling of public money, all in the name of their resettlement measures. he Directors General of Resettlement mentioned in the PIL include Major General V S Budhwar, Major General K S Sindhu, Major General Harwant Krishan and Major General S G Chatterji, who are all retired now. The documents relating to the scams show serious malpractices and swindling of money belonging to the retired soldiers and the national exchequer by faking recruitment of ex-servicemen and collecting salaries in their names, but without employment in actual; forging documents to show deposits of provident fund contributions of each of their recruits, but in actual pocketing the amount; and preparing forged, fake challans of service tax deposits.
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| Indian Sikh soldier guarding the Kargil victory memorial |
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| Sikh soldier of Indian Army Guarding the Himalayas |
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| Pakistani infiltration in Kargil sector |
An Indian Sikh soldier describing the victory over Pakistan at Kargil:
How infiltration was not detected?
Why did the Indian Infantry Brigade vacate the Bajrang Post in the Kaksar sector in Ladakh during winter. Brigadier Surinder Singh was the commander of the 121 independent infantry brigade in charge of Kargil in the summer of 1999. The Army initially dismissed Brig. Surinder Singh for his conduct during and after Kargil, shifting the focus from `intelligence' lapses. |
| Brigadier Surinder Singh, the whistle Blower |
Countering the charge that he vacated Bajrang Post, Brig. Singh put the blame squarely on Maj. Gen. Budhwar. According to the Brigadier, it was the Major General who ordered the vacation of Bajrang Post. Brigadier Singh claimed before the Punjab and Haryana high court that the threat perception conveyed by him to his immediate seniors before the war was ignored and the senior commanders were giving more importance to activities not connected to the defensive role of the army.
"Fighting troops were deployed for catching wild animals and birds and the defense resources were being used for making cages for animals and birds, their transportation, feeding and maintenance," claimed the former commander.
The Bungling Generals
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| Bungling Generals - Kishan Pal, VP Malik, and VS Budhwar |
Commanding la dolce vita Ladakh-style was Major-General Budhwar. His focus was obsessive, but none of it was on matters military. On May 16, 1998, 3 Division sent out instructions to its field units informing them of their commanding officer, Major-General V.S. Budhwar's new pet project: building a zoo for Leh, a town with a few thousand residents. Lieutenant-Colonel U.K. Singh sent out a second missive, marked 6361/9/ZOO/Q1, on June 8, 1998."Please ensure," the letter read, "that various types of wild animals/birds are procured and despatched to zoo at Leh at your earliest." "Cages required for transportation of animals/birds," it continued, "will be made under arrangements of respective b(riga)de(s)." "No representation," it concluded, "will be entertained."
He also found time to host top Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh cadre during the 1998 Sindhu Darshan Festival, which was run and managed at Army expense.
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| BJP leader LK Adwani at Sindhu Darshan festival |
IN his own judgment, General Pal was the hero of the Kargil war. He described the campaign he ran as "an example of General-ship unparalleled in the history of warfare". Was it so? On May 19, in the face of what intelligence experts and his own troops were telling him, Pal told the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar that the Kargil "situation was local and would be defeated locally". He insisted that there were "no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes".
The Evidence
Brig. Surinder Singh's real problems began in the first week of August 1999, when Outlook magazine carried an article claiming that Surinder Singh had, between August 1998 and March 1999, "sent six letters to his superiors, the Army Chief and the Defence Ministry informing them of increasing threat perception along the LoC, but nothing was done". Frontline published excerpts from several Army intelligence and 121 Brigade documents, showing that Surinder Singh had repeatedly asked for new equipment, and pointed to deteriorating security conditions along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil. Budhwar and his superiors in the Northern Command, however, did not act.Frontline obtained critical intelligence documents and internal military communications which vindicate Surinder Singh's claims. The documents establish that the Brigadier did indeed warn of the possibility of escalated violence in Kargil and a push across the Line of Control (LoC). The documents also show that his superiors, including former Chief of the Army Staff V.P. Malik, refused to act on these warnings, and even blocked 121 Brigade initiatives to defend Kargil more intensively.
On August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter marked 124/GSD/Vis. To this letter were attached the contents of Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of Malik on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides.
In terse military shorthand, the briefing paper warned of a “push [by] militants across the L[ine] (of) C[ontrol]. Pakistan, it said, could “engage NH [National Highway] IA with AD [Air Defence] w[ea]p[o]ns”, “t[ar]g[e]t selected f[or]w[ar]d posts,” and “hit Kargil and outlying vill[age]s”.
Right at the outset, the 121 Brigade briefing paper analysed, in terse military shorthand, the possible "En(emy) Pattern" for the coming months. Pakistan, paragraph 5(a) noted, would seek to keep conflict "alive after (the Pokhran-II) nuc(lear) blasts an d in view (of the) SAARC m(ee)t(in)g of 29 Jul(y) 98 and now for (the) NAM m(ee)t(in)g." This could come, paragraph 5(b) suggested, in the form of a "push (by) militants across the L(ine) (of) C(ontrol). Paragraph 6 noted that Pakistan troops would, amon g other thing, engage NH (National Highway) IA with AD (Air Defence) w(ea)p(o)ns", "t(ar)g(e)t selected f(or)w(ar)d posts", and "hit Kargil and out lying vill(age)s, if escalation takes place".
Paragraph 8, explicitly marked "Enhanced Threat Perception", laid out the reasons for the 121 Brigade's apprehensions. Sections (a) (i) to (iii) of this paragraph recorded fresh Pakistan troop movements, including the deployment of the 24 Sind Regiment, a reserve division from Gilgit, to forward positions at Olthingthang. Another battalion, the paragraph records, had moved "on priority" from Sialkot to Skardu. Heavy and medium guns had been inducted into the sector, paragraph 6 (b) noted, along with M-1 98 155 millimetre mortar, and light flashes, possibly laser designators for smart weapons or missiles, had been seen over Drass and Kargil."
From paragraph 13 onwards, the briefing notes detailed "Vulnerabilities (of the) 121 (I) Inf(antry) B(riga)de". This paragraph itself noted that National Highway 1A was vulnerable to fire from Pakistan positions on Twin Bumps, Bunker Ridge and Point 3249 , while the next paragraph pointed out that Kargil and its rear areas were open to shelling. Paragraph 15 laid out a whole new order of vulnerability. It pointed out that "infilt(ration) routes (were) available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to P anikhar, Yaldor and through nalas (streams)". Small detachments could be targeted, paragraph 15(b) noted, while paragraph 17 noted the existence of posts vulnerable to "rogue action".
On August 30, 1998, Major KBS Khurana of the 1/S23 Intelligence and Field Security Unit at Kargil sent out a hand-written note, marked 1/10/6, referring to disturbing information provided by a source code-named 3820SC. “It has been revealed,” Major Khurana wrote, “that 500 Afghan militants have been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into India in the near future”.
Early in January 1999, Colonel Oberoi called the attention of 3 Infantry Division Commander Major-General VS Budhwar to significant weaknesses in India’s forward defenses, on the basis of an exercise code-named “Jaanch.” In his January 30, 1999 letter, Colonel Oberoi stated enemy action could render “some posts untenable.” It proceeded to call for forces being permanently stationed on Point 5165-metres, Pariyon ka Talab and Point 4660-metres — now famous as Tiger Hill.
Brigadier Surinder Singh protested. In an August 12, 1998 letter, marked 101/GS (Ops)/ANE/R, he warned of the paucity of troops. “While the combating of an insurgency is an important role for the B[riga]de,” Brigadier Singh noted, “we must not loose sight of our primary role, that of ensuring the sanctity of the LoC and integrity of own territory. All the forces which can be spared for the anti-infilt[ration] role from integral t[roo]ps are already deployed.”
Like Lieutenant-General Pal, Major-General Budhwar was dismissive of his subordinates’ concerns. Early in 1999, the 9 Mahar Regiment was moved from its counter-infiltration positions along the Yaldor Langpa, and stationed near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, charged with protecting the Mashkoh-Dras stretch, was also pulled back.
Brig. Surinder Singh's warnings centered on infiltration, and not on conventional engagement. But those warnings, had they been acted on, could have led to early detection of Pakistan's intrusion. No politician, n o bureaucrat, no other military official has been punished for the strategic and tactical failures that led to the loss of over 500 Indian soldiers' lives on the Kargil heights in the summer of 1999. Instead, the one officer who tried to secure measures that could have saved at least some of those lives is paying the price for his superior officers' errors.
Major General Mohinder Puri, commander of the 8 Division which would soon lead the battle in Dras, played the role Pakistan’s Army chief, while 70 Brigade’s Davinder Singh acted as the General-Officer Commanding of Pakistan’s 10 Corps area. Towards the fag end of the exercise, the group gamed a brigade-strength assault on the stretch between Zoji La and Kargil. Pakistan could, the exercise demonstrated, occupy large stretches. Lieutenant-General Pal and Northern Army Commander Hari Mohan Khanna dismissed the idea.
Despite losing approximately a quarter of its troops, to commitments elsewhere, the 121 Brigade did what it could — a fact subsequently suppressed by the official Kargil Review Committee.
From Budhwar and 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal upwards, the Army top brass reacted with panic. Their tactic was to discredit Surinder Singh personally. If Budhwar had nothing but praise for him on July 8, 1999, Kishan Pal wrote a venomous assessment 20 days later. The Ministry of Defence public relations machine went into overdrive, using pliant journalists to suggest Surinder Singh was hysterical and unprofessional.Worst of all, Surinder Singh did indeed furnish evidence to show that he had reason to worry about the forward movement of Pakistan troops. In his second interaction with the committee in December 1999, the Brigadier pointed to a series of intelligence warnings that underpinned his concerns. Letter number 1793/Int dated July 21, 1998, issued by 3 Infantry Division to the 102 and 121 Brigades, mentioned that the 24 Sind regiment had moved to the Kargil sector. Another letter, 1793/Inf (II), sent the same day, quoted an extract from a 15 Corps Headquarters letter, number 1403/3/GS(A) dated July 11, 1998, noting that the 21 Azad Kashmir Battalion had moved to Skardu. A final letter, again numbered 1793/Inf but dated July 23, 1998, noted that a battalion had moved from Sialkot to the area across the LoC from Kargil. The KRC simply blacked out this material and made a false allegation against Surinder Singh.
Brig. Singh added that Maj. Gen. Budhwar overruled the request by him and the commanding officer of 4 Jat subsequently to reoccupy the Post at the earliest.
Bias of the Generals
Kargil-based 121 Brigade Commander Surinder Singh, his subordinate Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, and 70 Brigade Commander Devinder Singh have not been featured in any of the many television commemorations of the war — but in their unheard testimonies lies the story of staggering command failures that went unpunished. |
| A clear case of bias and discrimination against Brig. Davinder Singh, Kargil War Hero |
The armed Forces Tribunal indicted General Kishan Pal of bias against Brig. Singh under whose command some major victories of Kargil battle were won. Instead of war-time gallantry award, Brig, Singh received a peace-time award. Retired Brigadier Devinder Singh is a relieved man. The Kargil war veteran has won a 10-year old battle that has restored his military reputation and individual honour. In a landmark judgment, the Armed Forces Tribunal has ordered the Army to delete a distorted report on his performance report during the 1999 Kargil war, correcting a decade-old injustice against a professional soldier. The performance report of Lieutenant General Kishan Pal, then General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps, who oversaw operations in that sector not only cost him a war medal but also deprived the Brigadier of promotion as Major-General. Due to the 'fudged' battle accounts, Brig Singh was awarded only a Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) and not a Mahavir Chakra, which he was cited for.
According to Devinder Singh, General Pal's bias stemmed from the following reasons:
- In April 1999, Brigadier Singh warned of intrusions along the Kargil front, from Batalik to Drass.
- But his superiors dismissed his assessment
- In the middle of the war, Brigadier Singh had reported that 600 Pakistan army regulars were positioned in Batalik.
- But Lt General Pal said just 45 Pakistani irregulars were on the spot.
Colonel Oberoi was cashiered for his failure to defend against the intrusions — intrusions he had warned of, but was not given resources to act against. Brigadier Surinder Singh, too, was sacked. Brigadier Devinder Singh, lauded in India’s official history of the Kargil war — he “himself operated ahead to keep abreast of the developments during each battle and to inspire his battalions to give of their best” — was passed over for promotion. Many of the officers have moved the courts for justice, but given the slow pace of the Indian judicial system, it will likely be years before their pleas are ruled on.
Budhwar, sources told Frontline, has received only an administrative censure, which will not hamper his long-term career prospects. Kishan Pal, who gamed at the outset for a low-level engagement that his troops would complete in days, was made Quarter Master General. More career advance has been blocked not by his strategic mistakes, but by ill-health. Northern Army Commander H.M. Khanna and former Army chief Malik have had to face no official questioning at all of their conduct.
Ministry of Defence (MoD) now stares at the prospect of an over Rs 1,000-crore fraud in its retired personnel welfare organisation, where senior Major Generals have over the past eight years overseen the swindling of public money, all in the name of their resettlement measures. he Directors General of Resettlement mentioned in the PIL include Major General V S Budhwar, Major General K S Sindhu, Major General Harwant Krishan and Major General S G Chatterji, who are all retired now. The documents relating to the scams show serious malpractices and swindling of money belonging to the retired soldiers and the national exchequer by faking recruitment of ex-servicemen and collecting salaries in their names, but without employment in actual; forging documents to show deposits of provident fund contributions of each of their recruits, but in actual pocketing the amount; and preparing forged, fake challans of service tax deposits.
Bibliography
- http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/skeletons-in-the-generals-cupboards/article1867.ece
- http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1813/18130410.htm
- http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1710/17100300.htm
- http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1722/17220240.htm
- http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2013/stories/20030704006701400.htm
- http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/Former-Army-officers-loot-retired-soldiers-exchequer-under-watch/2013/09/15/article1784799.ece
- http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2115/stories/20040730003903800.htm
- http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/wronged-kargil-hero-gets-his-due-419123
- http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/controversy-over-failure-to-prevent-kargil-intrusions-takes-a-political-tone/1/256079.html
- http://dnasyndication.com/dna/article/DNMUM179653
- http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/wronged-kargil-hero-gets-his-due-419123
Well searched blog.
ReplyDeleteVery exhaustively written......
ReplyDeleteMaj Gen (Retd) Kuldip Singh Sindhu, VSM is a very industrious, an adept, outstanding officer of our holy Army. Am very proud of the General officer.
DeleteStill am eager to serve under his stewardship and able guidance.
Ex Sub (PA) Dharam Vir Singh
Presently serving in Education Department, Delhi as Ministerial Staff.