Bumbling Indian Generals and Sikh Military Leaders

General with his troops

Indian Army is a professional and disciplined force with commendable valour and courage. It has established its flags of miltary achievements from Shanghai to Tibet, Khyber Pakhtunwa to Kashmir, Burma to Bangladesh, Kongo to Lybia, Cyprus to Jerusalem, and France to Italy. It has tamed formidable opponents across the globe, such as Nazi, Dai Nippon, Chinese PLA, Turks, Italians, Belgian Mercenaries in Kongo, Palestine, Pakistanis, Afghan tribes, Tamil Tigers, to name a few.

The top brass, however has failed on multiple ocassions to lead the troops. Now lets discuss the conducts of some of these generals from various wars:

India-China War of 1962

Military strategy, however, is always and quite rightly, the hand-maiden of politics and the debacle of 1962 was basically a political failure. Field Marshal Cariappa apprised of the Chinese threat to Nehru who told him that it is not Army’s business. Krishna Menon is best remembered as the Defence Minister who lost the 1962 India-China war due to his politicking.  Lt General P.N. Thapar was selected as the fifth army chief invoking the seniority criteria - Thapar was a relation of Pundit Nehru.

Lt. Gen BM Kaul

Another blunder is the selection of some Nehru’s protégés to run the Indian Army. Lt Gen B.M. Kaul was given the command of the 4 Corps, has been one of the main persons indicted by the Henderson-Brooks Inquiry Commission. Kaul lacked combat experience and when Menon promoted Kaul, by superseding 12 senior officers, General Thimayya tendered his resignation. During the war, Kaul demonstrated his incompetence for which India is still suffering.

 Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul

Like Menon, Chief of Army Staff Gen. P.N. Thapar, was asked to submit his resignation in the middle of war but it was Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul who suffered the most serious setback to any senior Army officer. 

When the war broke out on 8 September 1962, Nehru was away from India. The Chinese attacked simultaneously on the Ladakh area and NEFA. Indian troops were unprepared and lacked equipment, weapons, and even warm clothings for the high altitude. Chinese managed to capture 11,000 km² of area in Aksai Chin and substantial area in NEFA. 

Indian Troop with Donkeys

The commander of IV Corps, Lt. General B.M. Kaul was not on the front lines and was in the Military Hospital, Delhi, recovering from an illness. Kaul was evacuated from the Namkha chu on October 8, having fallen sick due to the altitude, he was carried pick-a-back by ‘local’ porters. It was later discovered that one of them was a Chinese interpreter in a PoW camp in Tibet. The secrets were out!

Major General Anant Singh Pathania

Pathania from the illustrious Dogra clan commanded the 4th Infantry Division in the NEFA region during a critical stage of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and was severely criticized for his poor generalship, which led to the complete collapse and defeat of his division without a fight. 

President Radhakrishnan with Pathania and Kaul

In Kaul's absence, Pathania panicked and contacted Corps HQ requesting permission to withdraw from his positions at the Sela Pass. General PN Thapar and the top brass pleaded with Pathania against withdrawing. During the night of 17 November Pathania withdrew two battalions from Se-la without engaging the Chinese troops. He also closed his divisional HQ at Dirang Dzong and fled with his troops towards Assam. 

At the same time, the Chinese had rapidly invaded the Indian positions around Bomdila, encircling and ambushing the remaining Indian troops as they chaotically withdrew. Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, the commander of 62 Brigade who had withdrawn from Se-la only after being threatened with court-martial, was killed in an ambush.

Lt. Gen Harbakhsh Singh was flown post-haste to Tezpur to take over command of 4 Corps when Lt Gen B. M. Kaul had ‘fallen sick’ after the rout at Namka Chu and had been ‘summoned’ to Delhi.

Lt. General Harbaksh Singh

Harbakhsh inspired confidence in the defeated soldiers and commanders and began to once again re-build their morale. He had barely settled down and was busy re-organising the defences in NEFA to thwart further Chinese attacks when, inexplicably Kaul returned to re-claim his Corps … once the war was over.

India-Pak War 1965

Major General Niranjan Prasad

The book “1965 War- The Inside Story’s” by RD Pradhan in chapter number 8 speaks about the cowardice of Major General Niranjan Prasad, the commanding officer of the Indian Army’s Lahore sector. Pakistan Army attacked in such a manner that the Indian General and his platoon were forced to “run away!”

Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad

 The  official Willys jeep of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15th Indian Infantry Division was captured by the 18 Baloch Regt on 8 Sep 1965 at Wagah Sector (Lahore Sector) across the BRB Canal. 

Pak Troops with Generals Jeep

The jeep is now on display at the Quarter Guard of 18 Baluch Regt (now 3 Sind) in Pakistan.

On learning this, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh drove in a Jonga (Nissan P60 Jeep) to the battlefront. Army commander found that Pakistani air attack had created a havoc on the G.T. Road. Indian vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. 

Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: “He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved.” 

Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: “Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer.”

Lt, Gen Harbaksh Singh Inspecting

Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh, GOC, Western Command, disobeyed the then army chief and took on a superior Pakistani armoured column. The Indian Centurion tanks outgunned the more modern Pakistani Patton tanks in the battle at Khem Karan, that proved the turning point of the 1965 War.

Gen. JN Choudhury with Troops

Gen J. N. Chaudhary, the Chief of the Army Staff had ordered Harbakhsh to pull back to the Beas River after receiving exaggerated reports of the progress made by a Pakistani armoured column in the Khem Karan (Amritsar-Firozpur) sector may never be known.

 In his book “In the Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers”, Gen Harbakhsh has written: “Late at night on the 9th of September, the Chief of the Army Staff rang me up  … his advice was that to save the whole army from being cut-off by Pakistan’s armour push, I should pull back to the line of the Beas river.”

Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh

Pulling back to the Beas would have meant sacrificing prime territory in Punjab including Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts and would have been a far worse defeat than that suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. The move would have also resulted in bidding goodbye to the entire state of J&K and the army’s 15 Corps that had performed extremely well over there.”

Harbakhsh was adamant and refused to comply. He told Chaudhury that he would not accept a verbal order on such a crucial issue … A written order from the Army Chief never came. In any case the crisis was overcome when under Harbakhsh’s leadership the outgunned Centurions … and 106 mm guns … played havoc with Pakistani Patton tanks in one of the great tactical victories of the war.

In another book “Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers”, as per Sheikhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, revealed that: “not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation”.  

Lal Bahadur Shashtri on Pakistani tank with Gen RS Sparrow

Rock steady in the face of adversity, Lt. General Harbakhsh Singh provided outstanding leadership at a critical juncture. He was bigheartedly supported by Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shashtri. He was a genuine national hero and was honoured with the Padma Vibhushan by a grateful nation.

Lt. Gen Singh presenting Kirpan to PM Shashtri

India-Pak War 1971

The exception to this generalization was the leadership, planning, and execution by Indian Army's top leadership during the 1971 War with Paakistan. General Sam Manekshaw provided the leadership with alignment in unison with Indira, the political leader of the time. 

Maneckshaw with Indira

Lt. General Jagjit Singh Aurora GOC, Eastern Sector meticulously planned the Bangla liberation with almost clinical execution. He was ably assisted by others military leaders such as Lt. General JFR Jacobs and Major General Shabeg Singh who trained and led the Muktibahini.

Lt. Gen. JS Auroa accepting Pakistani Surrender

Kargil War 1999

The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC. The town of Kargil is located 127 miles from Srinagar. During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC.

Indian Army Post on Kargil Hill

Lt. General VS Budhwar

Brigadier Surinder Singh, the commander of the 121 independent infantry brigade in charge of Kargil in the summer of 1999 puts the blame on Indian generals. According to the Brigadier, it was the Major General VS Budhwar who ordered the vacation of Bajrang Post. 

Major General VS Budhwar

Commanding la dolce vita Ladakh-style was Major-General Budhwar. His focus was obsessive, but none of it was on matters military. On May 16, 1998, 3 Division sent out instructions to its field units informing them of their commanding officer, Major-General V.S. Budhwar's new pet project: building a zoo for Leh, a town with a few thousand residents. Lieutenant-Colonel U.K. Singh sent out a second missive, marked 6361/9/ZOO/Q1, on June 8, 1998."Please ensure," the letter read, "that various types of wild animals/birds are procured and despatched to zoo at Leh at your earliest." "Cages required for transportation of animals/birds," it continued, "will be made under arrangements of respective b(riga)de(s)." "No representation," it concluded, "will be entertained."

Singh claimed before the Punjab and Haryana high court that the threat perception conveyed by him to his immediate seniors before the war was ignored and the senior commanders were giving more importance to activities not connected to the defensive role of the army, "Fighting troops were deployed for catching wild animals and birds and the defense resources were being used for making cages for animals and birds, their transportation, feeding and maintenance," 

Bungling Generals - Krishanpal, Malik, and Budhwar

Lt. Gen Krishan Pal

From Budhwar and 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal upwards, the Army top brass reacted with panic. Their tactic was to discredit Surinder Singh personally. If Budhwar had nothing but praise for him on July 8, 1999, Kishan Pal wrote a venomous assessment 20 days later. The Ministry of Defence public relations machine went into overdrive, using pliant journalists to suggest Surinder Singh was hysterical, alarmist, and unprofessional. 

Lt Gen Krishan Pal

Krishan Pla was involved in another case of prejudice and bias against another Sikh office - Brigadier Devinder Singh. Exactly 11 years after the Kargil, the Armed Forces Tribunal has held that Lieutenant General Krishan Pal fudged reports of the conflict and showed bias towards Brig. Devinder Singh. The Brigade Commander was overlooked for promotion and was awarded a Vishisht Seva Medal, a non-gallantry award, even though he had been cited for the Mahavir Chakra. The Tribunal directed that relevant records and documents pertaining to operations by 70 Infantry Brigade in Batalik written by Lt Gen Krishan Pal, then General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps, be corrected and put in correct perspective. 

Brigadier Surinder Singh is still awaiting justice as the records pertaining to his case were allegedly damaged in a fire at army HQ.

Atal Bihari Vajpaee with Troops at Kargil

So, what happens to Krishan Pal? was he reprimanded? Did he receive a rap on the knuckles? Is a rap enough for letting his prejudices steal honour from a battle formation and commander that deserved much more than they got? Is there any procedure that will allow the country to bring this General to task, and complete the truth about what really happened, and how lies came to be told on official documents that will live forever in the treasure-chests of the nation? All questions worth thinking about. In my opinion, of course.

References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henderson_Brooks%E2%80%93Bhagat_Report

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/the-guilty-men-of-1962-india-china-war-jawahar-lal-nehru-krishna-menon-185333-2014-03-18

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anant_Singh_Pathania

https://www.theweek.in/theweek/leisure/the-war-that-wasnt-by-shiv-kunal-verma-gives-a-total-picture-of-the-1962-war.html

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-1965-war-with-pakistan-i/0/

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/books/story/20191209-how-menon-s-downfall-began-1623268-2019-11-29

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Himalayan_Blunder

https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/indiachina-war-the-true-story/article5847748.ece

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/ten-truths-about-the-1962-war/

http://sikhchic.com/our_heroes/the_man_who_saved_india_he_led_the_sikh_regiment_to_a_complete_rout_of_the_enemy

https://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-general-who-saved-punjab-in-the-1965-war/20150907.htm

https://www.dawn.com/news/1207251

https://www.parhlo.com/pakistanconqueredpunjab1965/

https://www.newsbred.com/article/september-1-a-launch-when-india-could-ve-lost-j-k-but-for-this-man

https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Gurmeetkanwal230915.pdf

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/19990920-the-army-cannot-operate-anywhere-and-everywhere-major-general-v.s.-budhwar-824196-1999-09-20#:~:text=Dragged%20into%20a%20flaming%20war,121%20Infantry%20Brigade%20at%20Kargil.

https://www.mansworldindia.com/currentedition/from-the-magazine/kargil-army-take-wrong-man-task-lapse/

https://www.firstpost.com/india/twenty-years-since-kargil-war-incompetence-and-veniality-of-generals-killed-soldiers-allowed-pakistan-to-cross-loc-7080971.html

https://www.livefistdefence.com/2010/05/aoa-what-happens-to-lt-gen-kishan-pa.html

https://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100527/main6.htm

https://theprint.in/walk-the-talk/this-kargil-hero-was-made-a-scapegoat-but-fought-to-restore-his-brigades-honour-and-won/268920/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harbaksh_Singh#cite_note-15

https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30209475.ece